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INTRODUCTION
Despite repetition of manifestly unacceptable claims and memo-facilitation of
unmistakable criminal behavior that was widespread and systematic, what former
President Bush and former Vice President Cheney finally admitted was their
Administration's "program" of "tough" interrogation and secret detention or forced
disappearance' had actually become a catalyst for reaffirmation of fundamental
* Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
1. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 170 (2010) (noting that Bush admitted authorizing
waterboarding, which is decidedly torture); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 150 (noting an early 2002 meeting of
Yoo, Gonzales, Addington, Flanigan, and Haynes discussing "what sorts of pain" to inflict), 185 (noting conflicts
between Addington and Bellinger), 198-99 (noting that Addington, Gonzales, Haynes, Goldsmith, and others had
flown to Guantinamo in September 2002 to discuss and observe use of patently unlawful Survival Evasion
Resistance and Escape tactics on detainees who were still held in secret detention or forced disappearance), 304,
307, 311-12 (noting the facilitating role of Gonzales) (2008); JOSE RODRIGUEZ, HARD MEASURES (2012)
(containing admissions regarding waterboarding and other coercive tactics by former Deputy Director of
Operations); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43
VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 1535, 1544-45, 1559-69 (2009) [hereinafter Paust, Absolute Prohibition] (noting certain
facilitating and abetting roles of Cheney, Addington, Gonzales, Rice, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Ashcroft, Yoo, Bybee,
Haynes, Bradbury, Rizzo, Feith, Philbin, Flanigan, Goldsmith, and others); Report, Senate Armed Services
Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Nov. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%/2OFinalApril%2022%202009.pdf;
Majority Staff Rep., House Committee on the Judiciary, Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and
Recommendations Relating to the Presidency of George W. Bush, 110-46, 136 (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ll0th/IPres09Oll3.pdf ("According to Col. Wilkerson, Secretary
Powell had also been troubled by the President's role in authorizing these harsh interrogation techniques; in
Secretary Powell's view, Mr. Bush was 'complicit' in these abuses."); Julian E. Barnes, CIA Can Still Get Tough
on Detainees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al; John Donnelly & Rick Klein, Bush Admits to CIA Jails; Top
Suspects Are Relocated, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al; Dan Eggen, Cheney Defends "Dunk in the Water"
Remark, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2006, at A2; Ken Herman, Bush Confirms Secret Prisons, Denies Torture,
61
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human rights, as well as basic human protections and duties under the laws of war.
One major development with respect to human rights law, and related laws of war,
during the last decade has been the continued rejection by various actors in the
international community of shameful and outrageous claims of the Bush-Cheney
Administration. Various members of their Administration have been reasonably
accused of authorizing or facilitating a number of interrogation tactics that were
clearly torture and others that were clearly cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading
treatment in patent violation of customary and treaty-based international law.2 The
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 7, 2006, at IA (noting that the CIA secret detention program "had held about 100
detainees"); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. PoST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al; Mark
Silva et al., Bush Confirms Use ofCIA Secret Prisons, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2006, at 1; R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Says
in Memoir He Approved Waterboarding, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2010, at A2 (noting that Cheney had also said that
he "'was a big supporter of waterboarding'); Bush Unrepentant, THE NEw ZEALAND HERALD, June 4, 2010, at
10; Jonathan Karl Hosts ABC's This Week, (ABC television broadcast Feb. 14, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR
3128836 (Cheney: "I was a big supporter of waterboarding. I was a big supporter of the enhanced interrogation
techniques."); Marlise Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A6 (describing the possible indictments of Gonzales, Yoo, Addington, Feith, Bybee, and
Haynes); NPR: All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast May 20, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 9628215
(recording of Ari Shapiro stating that Gonzales "signed off" several times on the use of a number of harsh tactics
several months prior to the August 2001 Bybee torture memo); Ximena Marinero, UN Torture Investigator Calls
on Obama to Charge Bush for Guantanamo Abuses, JURIST (Jan. 21, 2009, 8:31 AM),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2009/01/un-torture-investigator-calls-on-obama.php; see infra Torture Timeline,
Appendix.
See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS ix, 18, 35-40, 43-44, 171-72, 187, 190-92, 200, 231 (2006). John Yoo
wrote that he had also flown with other lawyers to Guantinamo Bay, Cuba in early January 2002. Id. Those
lawyers knew that persons transferred to GuantAnamo were held in secret detention because their names were not
released. Such conduct constitutes a form of forced disappearance, a crime against humanity that during an armed
conflict is also a war crime. See, e.g., Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra, at 1539 n.2 1.
2. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES AND TORTURE (Marjorie Cohn ed. 2011); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2010); CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY,
TERROR AND ANTI-TERRORISM (2006); MARJORIE COHN, COWBOY REPUBLIC: Six WAYS THE BUSH GANG HAS
DEFIED THE LAW (2007); MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH (2004); JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN
WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004); AMos N. GUIORA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION (2008); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO
ABU GHRAIB (2004); PETER JAN HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE
WAR ON TERROR (2009); JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006);
THOMAS MICHAEL MCDONNELL, THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISM 47-57, 60 (2009); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM (2008); MICHAEL P. SCHARF &
PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS 129-30, 181-95 (2010); Diane Marie Amann,
Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2086, 2094 (2005); Karima Bennoune, "To Respect and to Ensure":
Reconciling International Human Rights Obligations in a Time of Terror, 97 PROC., AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 23, 24
(2003); Astrid Birgden & Michael Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison": A
Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional
Settings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 256, 257-58 (2009); David Brennan, Torture of Guantdnamo
Detainees with the Complicity of Medical Health Personnel: The Case for Accountability and Providing a Forum
for Redress for These International Wrongs, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1005 (2011); Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture:
A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009); Marjorie Cohn, Advising Clients to Commit War Crimes
With Impunity: An Unethical Practice, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 249 (2011); Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and
Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457
(2003); Richard Goldstone, Combating Terrorism: Zero Tolerance for Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 343
(2006); Amos N. Guiora, Human Rights and Counterterrorism: A Contradiction or Necessary Bedfellows?, 46
GA. L. REv. 743, 747-50 (2012); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence,
Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427 ( 2006); Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing "Enemy
Combatants" and Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2007); Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-
2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 952-53, 965-66 (2009); David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in
62
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol18/iss1/3
Fall 2012 The Bush-Cheney Legacy 63
sordid story of serial criminality that was authorized, aided, and abetted by several
members of the Bush Administration (including a number of lawyers) is now
generally well known, but certain secretive aspects of the criminal program are still
unfolding.
Another major development in the future would involve the imposition of civil
and criminal sanctions against those who are reasonably accused of authorizing or
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162 (2007); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91
VA. L. REv. 1425 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
1231 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment,
Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 345-73
(2007) [hereinafter, Paust, Unlawful Authorizations]; Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to
Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
811, 824-51 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Executive Plans]; Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture and
Impunity: President Obama's First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151, 152 n.1 (2010)
(listing articles of several other text writers, including those of J6se E. Alvarez, M. CherifBassiouni, Benjamin G.
Davis, David E. Graham, Aya Gruber, Scott Horton, Peter Margulies, Jamie Mayerfield, Jennifer Moore, Ved P.
Nanda, Jens David Ohlin, Leila Sadat, David Scheffer, Evan Wallach, David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, and
W. Bradley Wendel); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 359-61 n.1 (2009)
[hereinafter Paust, Civil Liability] (listing additional articles of text writers, including those of Aaron R. Jackson,
Joseph Lavitt, Manfred Nowak, Gabor Rona, Margaret L. Satterwhite, and Elizabeth Sepper); Leila Nadya Sadat,
Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200
(2007); Michael P. Scharf, Keynote Address at the Michigan State University College of Law Symposium: The T-
Team, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 130, 130-31, 134-35 (2010); Philip Zelikow, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight
War, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2012), David Cole, The Taint of Torture: The Roles of Law and Policy in Our Descent
to the Dark Side, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 53 (2012), Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility: Torture and the
Higher Deniability, 49 HOuS. L. REV. 71 (2012); World Org. for Human Rights USA, Indefensible: A Reference
for Prosecuting Torture and Other Felonies Committed by U.S. Officials Following September 11th, at 3-19, 38-
156 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/documents/Indefensible
A Reference for Prosecuting Torture.pdf; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
United States of America, 87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006, 10, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec.
18, 2006), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsfl0/34d0a773a44de02bcl25725a0034cbdf/$FILE/GO645961.pdf; U.N.
Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States of America, 36th
sess., May 1-19, 2006, 11 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. CAT Rep.],
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133838.pdf ("[The U.S.] should recognize and ensure
that the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its
jurisdiction . . . ."); id. 15 ("[P]rovisions of the Convention ... apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons
under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world."); id. 1 19 ("[There
exists an] absolute prohibition of torture . . . without any possible derogation."); id. 1 24 ("[The U.S.] should
rescind any interrogation technique, including methods involving sexual humiliation, 'water boarding,' 'short
shackling' and using dogs to induce fear, that constitute[s] torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, in all places of detention under its de facto effective control, in order to comply with its obligation
under the Convention."); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, Lawfulness ofDetentions by the
United States in Guantanamo Bay, M 7(i)-(vi), 8(i)-(iii), (vii)-(viii) (Apr. 26, 2005), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link-/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1433.htm; Chairperson of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, et al., Rep., Situation ofDetainees at Guantdnamo Bay, U.N. Comm. on
Human Rights, 62nd sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. Experts' Rep.]; Int'l
Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody
(Feb. 2007) (quoted in Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, 56 THE N.Y. REV. OF BKS. no. 6
(Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22530), available at
http://pegc.us/archive/Organizations/ICRCrpt hvd 20070214.pdf; Torture Victims to Initiate Private
Prosecution against George W. Bush on his Arrival in Canada, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 19, 2011) (quoting
Manfred Nowak, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture), available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?
context-va&aid=27171 ("There is plenty of evidence that President Bush authorized enhanced interrogation
methods ... some of which amount to torture, such as waterboarding.").
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aiding and abetting international crimes, as is required under customary and treaty-
based international law.3 Those who are subsequently prosecuted would join the
increasing number of former heads of state and other governmental officials that
have been prosecuted either in international criminal tribunals or in various
domestic courts for authorizing or aiding and abetting conduct in violation of
international law.4 There is a continuing need to end impunity and, as recognized
by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, there can be no immunity
under international law' for those who authorize, aid and abet, or perpetrate
international crimes and such criminal conduct is ultra vires and, therefore, beyond
the lawful authority of any state or public official.6
I. REJECTION OF NINE FALSE BUSH-CHENEY CLAIMS
Interconnected with the international community's rejection of Bush-Cheney
claims that torture, cruel treatment, and inhumane treatment of other human beings
can be lawful has been the rejection of a number of specific claims made during
their Administration. These claims, made by Bush, Cheney, and their entourage,
concerned the reach of human rights laws and the laws of war. For example, there
has been notable rejection of their false claims that: (1) relevant human rights laws
that are binding on the United States and its citizens do not apply outside United
States territory;' (2) human rights laws do not apply during war or armed conflict;8
3. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 642, 654-55 (3d
ed. 2009) [hereinafter PAUST, LAW AND LITIGATION] (U.N. G.A. and S.C. resolutions); Paust, Unlawful
Authorizations, supra note 2, at 365-67; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 852-55; Paust, Absolute
Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1537-43, 1553-58 (addressing several specific and manifestly unlawful tactics such
as waterboarding, the cold-cell, use of dogs for terroristic purposes, and death threats); Paust, Civil Liability, supra
note 2, at 359-61.
4. See, e.g., ELLEN L. LUTz & CAITLIN REIGER, PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE (2009); Jordan J. Paust,
Genocide in Rwanda, State Responsibility to Prosecute or Extradite, and Nonimmunity for Heads of State and
Other Public Officials, 34 Hous. J. INT'L L. 57, 74-80 (2011).
5. See Judgment and Opinion, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (Oct. 1, 1946).
6. See id. (quoted infra note 35); see, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29,
33-43, 131-34, 138-42, 168-70 (3d ed. 2007) (noting the lack of immunity under international law for
international crimes and violations of human rights law); PAUST, supra note 2, at 37-38, 55, 166-67, 174, 196,
258, 261-62; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 853 n.154, 854 n.158; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra
note 1, at 1537-43; Paust, Civil Liability, supra note 2, at 364-74; see Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, pmbl., 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). When 160 states met in Rome in 1998 to create the International Criminal
Court, they recognized the determination of the international community "to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators" of core crimes under international law. Id.
7. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations
Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 390, 393-95,passim (2011); Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2,
at 823 n.43; Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 360 n.40, 371-72, & n.60 (erroneous claim of
Gonzales); Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1568 n.97; Johannes van Aggelen, The Consequences of
Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of its Victims, 42 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L.
21, 65-68 (2009); U.N. CAT Rep., supra note 2, IT 14-15 (quoted supra note 2); id. 1 18 ("[The U.S. should]
prohibit and prevent enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction . . . ."); id. 9 24 (quoted supra
note 2); Human Rights Comm. U.S. Rep., supra note 2; U.N. Experts' Rep., supra note 2, 1 11 ("[O]bligations of
the United States under international human rights law extend to the persons detained at GuantAnamo Bay."); id. T
83 ("International human rights law is applicable to the analysis of the situation of detainees in Guantinamo
Bay."); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, 1 4 ("At no time have detentions at
Guantdnamo Bay been within a 'legal black hole.' International human rights law has at all times been fully
applicable to all detainees. For those captured during the international armed conflict in Afghanistan, protection of
64 Vol. 18, No. I
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(3) alleged necessity can allow deviation from the absolute prohibitions of torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the laws of war and human
rights law;9 (4) certain detained persons have no rights under applicable laws of
war;' 0 (5) attempted U.S. reservations to two human rights treaties (which were
certain rights may have been complemented by the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL) for the
duration of that conflict."); see infra note I 1; see infra Part ll.A-C; but see Memorandum from Philip D. Zelikow,
Counselor to Sec'y of State Rice, The McCain Amendment and U.S. Obligations under Article 16 of the
Convention Against Torture 1 (Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Zelikow Memo], available at
http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/news/20120403/docs/Zelikow/ 2OFeb%201/5%202006.pdf (stating that in May
2005, State and Justice Departments thought that the CAT did not apply outside the U.S.).
8. See, e.g., LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT AND TERRORISM (2011);
Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 820-23; van Aggelen, supra note 7; U.N. CAT Rep., supra note 2, 1j 14
(quoted supra note 2); Human Rights Comm. U.S. Rep., supra note 2; U.N. Experts' Rep., supra note 2, 111 5-16
("The application of international humanitarian law and of international human rights law are not mutually
exclusive, but are complementary."); id. 1 83; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note
2, at 1j 4 (quoted supra note 7); see infra notes 43, 48, Part ll.A (there is no contextual limit regarding the reach of
U.N. Charter Article 56 duties). The new approach of the Obama Administration is reflected in a recent U.S.
Report to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR. See Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America
to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 11 506 (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/l17978 1.htm ("[T]he United States has
not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply 'in time of war.' Indeed, a time of war does not suspend
the operation of the Covenant to matters within its scope of application."); id. 11 507 ("[I]t is important to bear in
mind that intemational human rights law and the law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and
mutually reinforcing. These two bodies of law contain many similar protections. For example, prohibitions on
torture and cruel treatment exist in both . . . ."). It should also be noted that despite the fact that some are fond of
Latinized phrases as a substitute for law, under customary international law, there is no so-called lex specialis
substitution of the laws of war for human rights law in the context of war and no treaty contains such a Latinized
phrase. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach offHuman
Rights, Remedies, and Nonimmunity, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Paust, Bound by Human Rights],
available at http://www.Harvardilj.org/online.
9. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 824, 828, 835-36, 840 n.l 10; Paust, Unlawful
Authorizations, supra note 2, at 356-58; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1566; U.N. CAT Rep., supra
note 2, 19 (quoted supra note 2); U.N. Experts' Rep., supra note 2, 1142.
10. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 817-18 & n.20, 824-34, 839, 841-43, 849-52; Paust,
Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 349-50, 354, 358; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1568
n.98; William H. Taft IV, The Law ofArmed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319,
321-22 (2003) ("[Terrorists] are not 'outside the law.'. . . [they] forfeit any claim to POW status under the laws of
armed conflict, but they do not forfeit their right to humane treatment [under the 1949 Geneva Civilian Convention
and] . . . . customary law . . . [reflected] in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions....
safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled."); Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, 1 4 (quoted supra note 7). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-
31 & n.63 (2006) (stating that no gaps in coverage exist under the laws of war with respect to detainees of any
status and, at a minimum, common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is applicable during an armed
conflict); The Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY-96-21-T (Trial Chamber Judgment, Nov. 16, 1998) ("[T]here is no gap
between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions."); IV COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51, 595 (ICRC, Jean S. Pictet ed. 1958); 111
COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 51 n.1, 76, 423
(ICRC, Jean S. Pictet ed. 1960); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 137 (2 ed. 1998); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 145, 148, 150, 225 (2004); U.S. DEP'T ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 31,1173 (1956) ("If a person is determined by a competent tribunal, acting in conformity with Article 5,
... not to fall within any of the categories listed in Article 4, . . . he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of
war. He is, however, a 'protected person' within the meaning of Article 4 [of the Geneva Civilian Convention] . . .
."); but see "Legal Principles" Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, CIA (June 16, 2003). The
memo was finalized through exchanges of drafts between Muller, John Yoo and others. Id.; see, e.g.,
Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, CIA, to John Yoo, OLC, DOJ (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olcl 7.pdf; Office of Professional Responsibility,
DOJ, Rep. 100-04 (Jul. 29, 2009), available at
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known to be void ab initio as a matter of law) precluded their full reach regarding
absolute and peremptory prohibitions of all forms of torture, cruel, inhuman, and
other unlawful treatment;" (6) certain interrogation tactics that had already been
recognized as torture were not torture;12 (7) non-prisoners of war could be lawfully
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReportO9O729.pdf; see infra Torture Timeline, Appendix. It set
forth Bush's, Cheney's and their entourage's false claim that because members of al Qaeda were not POWs they
allegedly had no rights under the Geneva Conventions, and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 2441) allegedly did
not apply. See Memorandum from OGC, CIA [name redacted] to Patrick Philbin, Legal Principles Applicable to
CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel (June 16, 2003) [hereinafter CIA Muller
memo], available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olcl9.pdf. See, e.g.,
Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 627 & n.57. A related ploy was to claim that there are no rights of persons under the 1949
Geneva Conventions, but even a cursory look at their text reveals many express rights and a number of rights that
are implied from concomitant duties. Id.; Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of
Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 516 n.43 (2003).
11. First, it was known that attempted reservations to the ICCPR and the CAT were void ab initio as a
matter of law under the test set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See, e.g., Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]
(stating that attempted reservations are void if they are "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty");
U.N. Rep. of the Comm. against Torture, 23d & 24th Sess., Nov. 8-19, 1999, May 1-19, 2000, U.N. IM 179-80,
U.N. Doc. A/55/44; GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 44 (2000) (noting that putative U.S. reservation is "in violation
of the Convention" and unacceptable); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, General Comment on
Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant and Optional Protocols,
Nov. 2, 1994, 1 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) ("Reservations that offend peremptory norms would
not be compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.. . . Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right
to ... torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . ."); Paust, Executive
Plans, supra note 2, at 823 & nn.42-43 (demonstrating why the attempted reservations are void ab initio as a
matter of law because they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaties); Paust, Unlawful
Authorizations, supra note 2, at 370, 372; Zelikow Memo, supra note 7, at I (paying no attention to relevant
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in
conjunction with the O.A.S. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Charter, or customary
international law); see infra note 51. Concerning this ploy and the CAT, see, e.g., CIA Muller memo, supra note
10; see infra notes 51-52. Second, these absolute prohibitions had already been widely recognized as universally
applicable peremptory prohibitions jus cogens that obviate any contrary provisions of an international agreement
and, necessarily therefore, any contrary putative reservation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d), cmt. n (3d ed. 1987); Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 24, supra, 8; Vienna Convention, arts. 53, 64; see infra notes 35, 51. Third, it had been well
known that what is reflected in the ICCPR's and the CAT's full and absolute prohibitions of torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment is part of universally binding customary international law that is unavoidably
binding whether or not the attempted treaty reservations are void ab initio and of no legal effect. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, § 702(d), cmt. n; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 821-22. Fourth, the same absolute
human rights duties under Articles 55, paragraph c and 56 of the U.N. Charter remain in any event.
12. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 834-36, 843; Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra
note 2, at 359, 369-73; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1553-66, 1569; Jordan J. Paust, Criminal
Responsibility of Bush Administration Officials with Respect to Unlawful Interrogation Tactics and the
Facilitating Conduct of Lawyers, in THE UNITED STATES AND TORTURE: INTERROGATION, INCARCERATION, AND
ABUSE, supra note 2, at 285-88 (regarding the second 2002 Bybee memo), 289-92 (regarding the three 2005
Bradbury memos), 294-95 (regarding Rice's conduct and an unintended admission of complicitous action
regarding torture); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, $ 7(ii) ("[M]any detainees
have been subjected to ill-treatment amounting to torture which has occurred systematically and with the
knowledge and complicity of the United States Government."); U.N. Experts' Rep., supra note 2, 86 ("Attempts
by the United States Administration to redefine 'torture' . . . in order to allow certain interrogation techniques that
would not be permitted under the internationally accepted definition of torture are of utmost concern."); see infra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text; see also Editorial, 'Beyond Debate,' N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2012, at A28
(describing that "offensive rationalizations" and dishonesty did not change the fact that persons under the direction
of Bush "engaged in [activities which] plainly included torture"). Concerning the ploy that waterboarding was not
torture, see, e.g., CIA Muller memo, supra note 10 (alleging that use of "the water board" is not torture and does
not violate law). This ploy ignored the fact that cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatments are also proscribed under
66
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol18/iss1/3
Fall 2012 The Bush-Cheney Legacy 67
transferred from occupied territory to secret detention sites and to Guantinamo Bay
for coercive interrogation, lawful interrogation, or detention;13 (8) the President and
his entourage are not bound by the laws of war, and more generally, that they were
above the law;14 and (9) through such manifestly unacceptable ploys, members of
the Administration could avoid criminal prosecution for authorizing, aiding, and
abetting international criminal conduct.' 5
John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice during 2001-2003, provided a revealing
admission that demonstrates why some of these impermissible claims arose early
during the Bush-Cheney Administration and what drove Bush, Cheney, Addington,
Gonzales, Rice, and others to authorize and abet criminal coercive behavior.' 6 As
he confirmed, detention, denial of Geneva protections, and coercive interrogation
"policies were part of a common, unifying approach to the war on terrorism."' 7
customary and treaty-based human rights and humanitarian law in all circumstances. See supra note 11; see infra
notes 56-60, 66 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 850-51; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at
1567-68; Sadat, supra note 2, at 1201-05, 1208-11, 1220-25, 1227-38; Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, 1| 7(vi) ("[T]he United States has engaged in the unlawful practice of secret
detention."); id. 11 7(vii) ("[TIhe United States has, by practising [sic] 'rendition' (removal of persons to other
countries, without judicial supervision, for purposes such as interrogation or detention), allowed detainees to be
subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of the prohibition of non-
refoulement."); id. 11 8(ix) (noting that the U.S. must "cease the practice of 'rendition' in violation of the
prohibition on non-refoulement").
14. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 856-61; Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note
2, at 381-99 (stating that the Framers and numerous cited cases uniformly affirm that the President and all
members of the Executive branch are bound by treaty-based and customary laws of war); see infra note 25. With
respect to the fact that constitutionally-based duties of military personnel are duties to the country, and not merely
to the President, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) ("No man in this country is so high that
he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. It is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives."); DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE
CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 113-15 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 825-27, 830, 852-55; Paust, Absolute Prohibition,
supra note 1, at 1564-66; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, 11 8(ii) ("The
Assembly . . . calls on the United States Government to ensure respect for the rule of law and human rights by
remedying these situations . . . [and seek] to investigate, prosecute and punish all instances of unlawful treatment
of detainees, no matter what the status or office of the person responsible."); see infra notes 35, 50; Paust, Civil
Liability, supra note 2, at 361 ("Prosecution of several lawyers within the Bush Administration for complicity
would be on firm ground, especially with respect to those who wrote memoranda that facilitated the common,
unifying plan devised by an inner circle to use torture and other forms of coercive interrogation. As noted . . . ,
criminal complicity can occur when a person is aware that his or her conduct (e.g., writing a memo stating that
waterboarding is not torture) can or will assist or facilitate conduct of a direct perpetrator. The person who aids
and abets need not know that the conduct of the direct perpetrator is criminal or, for example, whether the conduct
constitutes 'torture' or cruel or inhuman treatment. It suffices that an accused was aware of the relevant factual
circumstances, and even a direct perpetrator need not have known that his or her act amounted to an inhumane act
either in the legal or moral sense. Furthermore, all acts of assistance, by words or acts and omissions, that lend
encouragement or support will suffice if the accused knows or is aware that such conduct can or will facilitate the
use of an illegal tactic or form of treatment."). Concerning aiding and abetting, complicity, or accomplice liability,
see, e.g., id. at 361 n.2; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
16. See Yoo, supra note 1, at ix, 30, 35, 39-40, 43, 171-72, 178, 187, 190-92, 202.
17. Id. at ix. & 30 (noting that in December 2001 and for months thereafter Gonzales chaired the meetings
"to develop [such] policy"); supra note 1. Concerning the chairing of meetings by Gonzales, see also Paust,
Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 834 n.89, 848 n.138. The Bush-Cheney common plan was actually not fully
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Instead of "following the Geneva Conventions," the inner-circle decided whether
such treaty law "would yield any benefits or act as a hindrance."18 The inner circle
knew that following Geneva law would "interfere with our ability to . . .
interrogate,"' 9 since "Geneva bars 'any form of coercion."' 20 For the inner circle,
"[t]his became the central issue." 21 Contrary to time-honored methods of lawful
interrogation to obtain reliable intelligence, "Geneva's strict limitations on . . .
questioning" supposedly "made no sense."22 They calculated that "treating the
detainees as unlawful combatants would increase flexibility in detention and
interrogation," 2 3 and the question became merely "what interrogation methods fell
short of the torture ban and [allegedly] could be used"24  as "coercive
interrogation."25 These interrogation methods actually included unlawful cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.26 John Yoo also admitted that "some of the
worst possible interrogation methods we've heard of in the press have been
reserved for the leaders of al-Qaeda that we've captured." 2 7 He stated, with
remarkable candor and abandonment, "I've defended the administration's legal
common or unifying among professional lawyers in the Departments of State and Defense or the military services.
See infra note 68.
18. YOO, supra note 1, at 35.
19. Id. at 39.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 39-40.
23. Id. at 43. But see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. YOO, supra note 1, at 171; see also id. at ix (by focusing "on what constituted 'torture' under the law . .
our agents [supposedly, but erroneously] would know exactly what was prohibited, and what was not"); id. at 172
("OLC addressed this question: what is the meaning of 'torture."'). This is an example of manifestly
unprofessional advice, leaving unstated, for example, the absolute ban under several treaties of the United States
and customary international law of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
25. See id. at 172 ("harsh interrogation short of torture"); id at 177 ("Congress banned torture, but not
interrogation techniques short of it . .. coercive interrogation [is permitted]."); id. at 178 ("Methods that . .. do not
cause severe pain or suffering are permitted."); id. at 187 ("American law prohibits torture but not coercive
interrogation," such as "using 'excruciating pain."'); id. at 190-91 (coercive interrogation was used); id. at 192; id.
at 202 ("[C]oercive interrogation ... should not be ruled out.").
This ploy that only torture was banned under U.S. law was manifestly erroneous. First, for example, since the
Supreme Court decision in Er parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942), it had been well known that all of the laws
of war (and not merely prohibitions of torture) have been incorporated by reference for criminal sanction purposes
through 10 U.S.C. § 818, that violations are thereby offenses against the laws of the United States, and that federal
district courts have jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 242-47 (3rd ed. 2007);
Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 824 n.47. Second, the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, had
incorporated all provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions by reference for criminal
sanction purposes as well as certain other laws of war. See, e.g., id.; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 824.
Third, treaty-based and customary laws of war and human rights law are part of the laws of the United States and
are binding on all members of the Executive branch. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 111 and cmnts. c,
e; PAUST, LAW AND LITGATION, supra note 3, at 120-532; JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 7-16, 67-80, 169-73 (2d ed. 2003); Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the
Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 205, 231-45 (2008); supra note 14.
26. YOO, supra note 1, at 200. Noting that such tactics were authorized for use in Iraq, see, e.g., Paust,
Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 843, 847 & n.135.
27. John Yoo, Agreement Reached on McCain Torture Amendment (National Public Radio broadcast Dec.
15, 2005); see also YOO, supra note 1, at 190-91.
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approach to the treatment of al-Qaeda suspects and detainees," including the use of
torture.28
In view of such manifestly erroneous claims, and the serial and cascading
criminality that had been either purposely or predictably facilitated by use of such
claims, it is worth reiterating why treaty-based and customary human rights laws
apply globally and in all social contexts, including in contexts of war or armed
conflict, and when responding to non-state actor terrorism.
II. THE GLOBAL REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Global Reach Under the United Nations Charter
With respect to the United Nations and its entities, a significant mandate
appears in Article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter.29 It expressly requires that
"the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."3 0 This Charter-based mandate
incorporates customary human rights by reference and requires global respect for
and observance of such rights. This express obligation of the United Nations also
conditions the authority of its entities, such as the Security Council, the General
Assembly, and Secretariat, and even individual U.N. personnel.
Members of the United Nations, such as the United States, are similarly bound
under Article 56 of the U.N. Charter "to take joint and separate action . . . for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."32 Therefore, the United States
has the duty to promote through joint and separate action, "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" in accordance
with the Charter.3 3 Clearly, there are no geographical limits of such an obligation,
28. John Yoo, President's Power in Times of War, TRIBUNE-REVIEW (Greensburg, PA), Dec. 25, 2005.
Concerning the role that Yoo played, see also Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 830-33, 834-35 n.89, 842-
43, 856 & n. 172, 858, 861-62 & n.198; Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 358 n.27.
29. U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c; see also art. 1, para. 3.
30. Id. at art. 55, para. c.
31. See, e.g., MYREs S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 332-34 (1980); PAUST, LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 52 and references cited; 2
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 920, 923 (Bruno Simma, et al., eds., 2d ed. 2002);
Paust, Bound by Human Rights, supra note 8.
32. U.N. Charter art. 56. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter mandates that, "[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. Charter
art. 103. For this reason, if a particular human rights treaty does not have a universal reach and there is a clash or
inconsistency with respect to the universal obligation of a party under the U.N. Charter, the obligation under the
U.N. Charter remains extant and "shall prevail."
33. See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 55, para. c, 56; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, U.N.
G.A. Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) ("Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal
respect for and observance of human rights" (emphasis added)), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971); HURST HANNUM, S. JAMES ANAYA, DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 83 (5th ed. 2011) (quoting George Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, "members of the United Nations have a legal duty to promote respect for and protection
of human rights around the world'). Concerning Charter-based human rights duties of states, see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
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and there are no other limits with respect to social contexts, such as those involving
measures of self-defense, terrorism, war, or other social violence. More
importantly, the International Court of Justice has recognized that "a denial of
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter," 34 a recognition that pertains to conduct engaged in by many members
of the Bush-Cheney Administration.
With respect to the limits of state authority, lawful delegations of state
authority, and non-immunity of individuals accused of international crimes such as
war crimes, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized that "[h]e
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of
the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law."" Similarly, states, such as the United States,
have no authority to violate customary human rights law that can be lawfully
delegated.
B. Global Reach Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
The reach of one of the major human rights treaties, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3 6 is also global. The preamble to the ICCPR
expressly refers to "the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations
to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms.
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 1, 42,
1| 91 (noting a relevant violation "is ... manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations"); Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South-Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 3, 57 (1970)
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion South West Africa]; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980);
Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 82 (Jan. 12) ("[F]undamental rights for all
human beings . . . , and the existence of a corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe
them, are now reflected, inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and corresponding portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."); see infra notes
34, 37.
34. Advisory Opinion South West Africa, supra note 33, at 57, 131. In 1948, two Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that a racist California law "stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of" the obligation
under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter and "[i]ts inconsistency with the Charter ... is but one more reason why
the statute must be condemned." Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 672-73 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring, with
whom Rutledge, J., joins); see also id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring, with whom Douglas, J., joins) ("How can
this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens
on account of race are permitted to be enforced?").
35. Judgment and Opinion, International Military Tribunal, supra note 6. See also The Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998),
flI 153, 155, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, 349 (1999) ("[The prohibition of torture] has evolved into a peremptory
norm orjus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even
'ordinary' customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that . . . [the proscription of
torture] cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties . . . . Treaties or customary rules
providing for torture would be null and void ab initio . . . [and states cannot take] national measures authorizing or
condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators."). This opinion of the ICTY reflects the fact that internal law is no
excuse. Concerning this customary precept, see Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, Prin. II, 5
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12, at 11-14,1 99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
36. ICCPR, supra note 33.
37. Id. pmbl. See also id. art. 16 ("right ... everywhere"). Importantly, other global human rights treaties
contain the same express recognition. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
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This preambler provision is a recognition that is highly relevant to proper
interpretation of the ICCPR and its reach.3 8 Additionally, Article 2, paragraph 1, of
the ICCPR affirms that each party will respect and "ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" in the International
Covenant.39
Although the ICCPR is a global treaty and generally applies universally, the
Human Rights Committee that operates under the ICCPR has formally recognized
pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, pmbl., adopted by G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006); Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Dec.
10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]; see also Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/171 (Dec. 19, 2006), pmbl. ("Reaffirming that States are under
the obligation to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons. . . ."); 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) ("[A]ll human rights are universal . .. [and]
all States ... have the duty to promote and protect human rights . . . ."); Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable
International Order, G.A. Res. 55/107, 1 5 ("[The resolution] stresses that all human rights are universal . . . and
that the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner."); U.N. GAOR 55th
Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107 (Dec. 4, 2000); World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration and
Programme of Action, June 14-25, 1993, § 1, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993) ("All human rights
are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human
rights globally [and] . . . it is the dtity of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms."); Declaration on Principles of International
Law, supra note 33; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (describing the "universal respect for and
observance of human rights"), G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
38. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(2) ("The context for the purpose of interpretation
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble .... ). As the preamble notes, the creators
of the ICCPR were "[c]onsidering" this universal Charter-based obligation when drafting the ICCPR. ICCPR,
supra note 33, pmbl. The fact that Article 16 is another part of the text and refers to a "right ... everywhere" adds
to recognition that the proper interpretation of the ICCPR is that it reaches beyond the territory of a state party.
Obviously also, the object and purpose of the ICCPR is to assure that there exist real rights for human beings, and
this also informs the meaning of the treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(1) ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith .. . and in light of its object and purpose."). See also Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 24, supra note 11, 1| 7, 11-12. For the principle of pacta sunt servanda (which requires
performance of a treaty in good faith), see Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 26 (requires parties to a treaty to
adhere to its purpose and shared meaning "in such a manner that its purpose can be realized"); Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 11 33. Moreover, while interpreting a treaty "[t]here shall
be taken into account ... any relevant rules of international law applicable." Vienna Convention, supra note 11,
art. 31(3)(c). The universal reach of human rights obligations under the United Nations Charter (expressly
considered and referred to in the preamble to the ICCPR) obviously is relevant international law concerning the
reach of obligations under the ICCPR and so are the other treaties and legally relevant instruments addressed. See
supra note 37. Moreover, if one could only interpret the ICCPR in a manner that creates an unavoidable clash
between the global human rights obligations under the United Nations Charter and those under the ICCPR, U.S.
obligations under the U.N. Charter would prevail. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 103 (quoted supra note 32). Article
5, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR declares that "[t]here shall be no restrictions upon or derogations from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law,
conventions, . . . or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it
recognizes them to a lesser extent." ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 5(2). Further, Article 46 states: "Nothing in the
present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." Id art. 46.
With respect to derogable rights, the Covenant also requires that states adopting derogating measures must assure
that they "are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law." Id. art. 4, para. 1.
39. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 2(1). The language is read as including all individuals who are "within its
territory" and all individuals who are otherwise "subject to its jurisdiction," partly because individuals within the
territory of a state are obviously within its jurisdiction and limiting the word "jurisdiction" to territory of a state
would make the phrase "and subject to their jurisdiction" nonsensically redundant, operate contrary to general
international law that recognizes forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction and responsibility, and operate contrary to
the universal reach of human rights obligations under the United Nations Charter that is expressly referred to in the
ICCPR and a necessary aid to its proper interpretation. See also infra note 40.
11
: The Bush-Cheney Legacy
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012
Barry Law Review
that the persons who are protected, or who have rights under the ICCPR, are those
who in a given instance are either: (1) within the territory of a party to the treaty, or
(2) within its "power or effective control.,4o As noted in an article addressing self-
defense targeted killings in a foreign country and whether targeted persons have
relevant human rights,
the critical question is whether a person being targeted by a drone
flying in the airspace of a foreign country is within the jurisdiction,
actual power, or effective control of the state using the drone.
Such a person is clearly not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
state responding in self-defense (unless the person is within
territory that is occupied by the responding state and is, therefore,
within a related form of territorial jurisdiction) and such a person
does not appear to be within the actual "power or effective control"
of the responding state. It is evident, therefore, that human rights
protections do not pertain.4 1
This recognition is also relevant in the context of war. Contrary to claims of the
Bush-Cheney Administration, 42 treaty-based and customary human rights laws
apply globally during war and when fighting terrorism. 43 Yet, as noted above, those
40. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Nature of the Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant, 80th sess.1| 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21I/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) ("[The treaty rights apply] to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means . . . anyone within the power or effective control of the State party,
even if not situated within the territory of the State . . . . [It] also applies to those within the power or effective
control of the forces of a State party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such
power or effective control was obtained ... ); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 226, %J 108-11 ("[The ICCPR] is applicable in respect of acts
done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory."); PAUST & BASSIOUNI, supra note 25,
at 812-13, 816; NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 123-25, 135-36, 139 (2008) ("Lack
of physical custody must be determined by reference to the level of control actually exercised over the . . .
person."); Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 361 n.40; cf MELZER, supra, at 125-28 (regarding
practice under the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which "does not have a
jurisdiction clause"); but see id. at 138 (arguing for a far looser standard of "effective control or . . . directly
affected" and claiming that "every targeted killing . . . outside the territorial jurisdiction of the operating State
brings the targeted person within the 'jurisdiction' of that State" and that all that should be required is that a state
exercise "sufficient factual control or power to carry out a targeted killing"). With respect, the power to carry out
an attack on a particular target (by drone, aircraft, artillery, or long distance sniper fire) is simply not the same as
having actual "power or effective control" over the individual, especially if the person has not been captured,
cannot be relatively easily captured or otherwise detained, can attempt to run away, or can fight back.
A similar circumstance exists with respect to application of certain protections for persons under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Geneva Protocol I if they are not "in the hands of' or "in the power of' a party to the conflict or
subject to being "treated" or to "treatment" under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (which assumes
some control over the person being treated and who has the right to humane treatment). See, e.g., PAUST &
BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at 683.
41. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of US. Use of Drones
in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 264-65 (2011) [hereinafter Paust, Self-Defense Targetings].
42. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID STEWART, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 331-32 (3d ed. 2002); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 299-306 (ICRC 2005); RICHARD B. LILLICH, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 216 (4th ed. 2006); MELZER, supra note 40, at 76-78; PAUST, supra note 2, at 4,
140 n.35; PAUST & BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at 640 (quoting Johann Bluntschli's recognition in 1866 that
72 Vol. 18, No. I
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persons who have human rights in particular instances must be within either the
territorial jurisdiction or the actual power or "effective control" of a state or other
actor possessing human rights duties. For this reason, and in view of the relevant
human rights at stake and the laws of war concerning lawful killing, detention, and
treatment of detained persons during war, application of general human rights law
does not inhibit lawful military conduct on the battlefield, or more generally,
"[h]uman rights remain in force during war"); id. at 653, 676, 811, 813; Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 241, IT 216-20, 345(3); Legal Consequences of the
Construction, supra note 40, Ji| 104-106; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion
1996 1.C.J. 95, 226, 239-40, 1 25 (July 8) ("[Regarding derogable rights,] the protection of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4."); Philip
Alston et al., The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and Its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed
Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the War on Terror, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183, 192-97 (2008) (offering an
extensive survey of international institutional recognitions); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected
Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 184-86 (2005);
Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who Commit International
Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1996); Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 820-23 & n.35; Paust, Self-
Defense Targetings, supra note 41, at 265-66; see also Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1535-37
(stating human rights law applies in all social contexts, including contexts in which humanitarian law applies);
Alfred de Zayas, The Status of Guantanamo Bay and the Status of Detainees, 37 U.B.C. L. REV. 277, 281-82,
309-10 (2004); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119 (1866) ("By the protection of the law human rights are secured
[during the U.S. Civil War]."); The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 193 (1814) (Story, J.) (noting that "rights of humanity"
pertain in time of war); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-44 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 21 (1864) (stating "the most sacred questions of human rights" are at stake
concerning war-time courts-martial); Second Optional Protocol, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, art.
2 ("in time of war"); S.C. Res. 1738, 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 738 (Dec. 23, 2006) (describing the "violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict"); S.C. Res. 1265, 14, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999); G.A. Res. 63/166, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/166 (Feb. 19, 2009) ("[F]reedorn
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a non-derogable right that must be
protected under all circumstances, including in times of international or internal armed conflict or disturbance.");
see also G.A. Res. 62/148, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/148 (Mar. 4, 2008); see also G.A. Res. 60/148, pmbl.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/148 (Feb. 21, 2006); G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 at 206 (Dec. 15, 1989); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27(1), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (Nov. 22, 1969) ("In time of war"); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15(1) ("In time of war"), (2) ("lawful acts of war"), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
Eur.T.S. No. 5 (1950); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, art.
2, June 8, 1990, O.A.S. T.S. No. 73, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 1042, 20th Sess. ("in wartime"); Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Eur. T.S. No. 114
(1985) ("in time of war"); S.C. Res. 1199, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (describing the
"violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law"); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art.
72, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (noting the "other applicable rules of international law relating to protection of
fundamental human rights during international armed conflict"); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, pmbl., June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; G.A. Res. 59/182, pmbl. &1Ji| 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/182 (Mar. 8,2005) ("Recalling
... that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person . . . .");
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, supra note 40, 11 11 ("[T]he Covenant applies also in situations
of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While. . . more specific rules
of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant
rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive."); Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 29, 11 3,9, 11 & n.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1 1 (Aug. 31, 2001); Human Rights Comm.
U.S. Rep., supra note 2; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, supra note 2, at 1 4 (quoted
supra note 7); Coard v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. No. 109/99, 1 39 (Sept. 29, 1999) ("[C]ore
guarantees apply in all circumstances, including situations of conflict" and regarding the law of war and human
rights law, "the potential application of one does not necessarily exclude the other. There is an integral linkage . . .
because they share a common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a 'common purpose of protecting human life
and dignity' and there may be a substantial overlap."); see infra note 47.
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during an armed conflict." For example, once a person is detained, he or she is
obviously within the actual power or effective control of the detaining power and is
entitled to freedom from torture under the laws of war and human rights law.45
C. Global Reach Under the Convention Against Torture
Also contrary to the Bush-Cheney Administration,4 6 the international
community has reaffirmed that the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 47 applies globally and in
all social contexts, including during war and while responding to terrorism. 48 Its
prohibitions of all forms of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of
persons of any status are absolute, and therefore are without exception. 4 9 Protected
persons are those detained by a party to the treaty or who are otherwise under its
effective control.50 A putative U.S. reservation to the Convention, if operative,
44. See, e.g., Paust, Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 41, at 272-73 & nn.92-94.
45. See, e.g., id. at 369-73; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 816-21.
46. See, e.g., Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 369-73 (also addressing other related ploys
of Secretary Rice on behalf of the Administration in an attempt to facilitate unlawful treatment of detainees);
Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1568 n.97 (regarding a 2002 memo from Bybee to Haynes); Sadat,
supra note 2, at 1222 (noting that the CAT applies abroad).
47. CAT, supra note 37.
48. Id. art. 2(2) ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification . . . ."); U.N. CAT
Rep., supra note 2, 14 (quoted supra note 2); id. 1 15 (quoted supra note 2); id. 1 19 (quoted supra note 2); id 1
24 (quoted supra note 2); supra note 46.
49. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 37, art. 4(1) ("[All parties] shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law" and "[tihe same shall apply . . . to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or
participation in torture" and, therefore, whether or not such person has custody or control over the victim. See also
id. art. 1(1) (the crime reaches conduct "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of'
certain persons, thereby demonstrating that such persons need not have custody or control of victims)); U.N. CAT
Rep., supra note 2, 13 ("[S]ections 2340 and 2340 A of [title 18 of] the United States Code limit federal criminal
jurisdiction over acts of torture to extraterritorial cases. The Committee also regrets that, despite the occurrence of
cases of extraterritorial torture of detainees, no prosecutions have been initiated under the extraterritorial criminal
torture statute. ... [The U.S.] should enact a federal crime of torture consistent with article I of the Convention ...
to prevent and eliminate acts of torture . . , in all its forms... . [The U.S.] should ensure that acts of psychological
torture ... are not limited to 'prolonged mental harm' as set out in the State party's understandings lodged at the
time of ratification of the Convention, but constitute a wider category of acts, which cause severe mental suffering,
irrespective of their prolongation or its duration."); id. 15 (quoted supra note 2); id. 1 19 (quoted supra note 2);
Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1569-70, 1573.
50. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 37, pmbl. ("Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant .. ., both of which provide that no one may be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . [and] [diesiring to make more effective the struggle
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . throughout the world."); Paust, Executive
Plans, supra note 2, at 823 n.43; U.N. CAT Rep., supra note 2, 1 15 (quoted supra note 2); id. 17 ("The State
party should ensure that no one is detained in any secret detention facility under its de facto effective control.
Detaining persons in such circumstances constitutes, per se, a violation of the Convention."); id. 1 18 ("The State
party should adopt all necessary measures to prohibit and prevent enforced disappearance in any territory under its
jurisdiction, and prosecute and punish perpetrators, as this practice constitutes, per se, a violation of the
Convention."); id. 1 22 ("[D]etaining persons indefinitely without charge, constitutes per se a violation of the
Convention."); id. $ 24 (quoted supra note 2); id. 1 25 ("The State party should promptly, thoroughly and
impartially investigate all allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment by law
enforcement personnel and bring perpetrators to justice, in order to fulfill its obligations under article 12 of the
Convention."); id. 1 26 ("The State party should ... eradicate all forms of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by
its military and civilian personnel, in any territory under its jurisdiction . . . .").
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would result in a failure to cover all violations of the Convention and, therefore, the
attempted reservation is unavoidably "in violation of the Convention."' As in the
case of any attempted reservation that is incompatible with the purpose of a treaty,
the attempted reservation to the Convention is void ab initio as a matter of law and
can have no legal effect.5 2 Additionally, the putative reservation is inconsistent
with peremptory rights and duties jus cogens, thus it is legally inoperative. 53
Therefore, the attempted reservation cannot protect the United States, or any U.S.
national, from criminal, civil, or other appropriate sanctions.
III. RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS
Once an individual is detained by a member of the United Nations and a party
to the International Covenant and the Convention Against Torture, it is obvious
that such a person is within the actual power or effective control of the member-
state party. Therefore, that person has relevant human rights under the United
Nations Charter, the International Covenant, and the Convention Against Torture.
In general, his or her rights can either be: (1) those of a relative nature because they
have certain express limitations or can be derogated from in certain circumstances,
or (2) those of an absolute nature. For example, some human rights are set forth in
instruments with express and potentially broad limitations,5 and some human
rights can be derogated from if necessary in time of public emergency threatening
the life of the nation and if the derogations are not inconsistent with other
obligations under international law (such as the laws of war) and do not involve
impermissible discrimination based solely on certain grounds. 5 However, as is the
case under the Convention Against Torture, 56  several other human rights
instruments, 57 and the laws of war,5 Article 7 of the International Covenant
51. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 190 n.59 (addressing the 2006 U.N. Experts' Rep. on the Situation of
Detainees at GuantAnamo Bay, supra note 2, that agreed with the decision of the CAT Committee that the putative
reservation was "in violation of the Convention." Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against
Torture: United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/55/44, at J 179-180 (May, 15, 2000)); O'Connell, supra note 2,
at 1251 (noting the understanding "cannot alter ... legal obligations under the CAT"); Paust, Executive Plans,
supra note 2, at 823 & n.43; supra note 11. Second, the attempted reservation is inconsistent with and obviated by
peremptory rights and duties jus cogens. See supra note 11. Third, the attempted limitation or false understanding
is also incompatible with customary international law and U.N. Charter obligations regarding cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment that pertain in any event. See U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56, 103; supra notes I1, 30-34, 37.
52. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note I1, art. 19(c); MCDONNELL, supra note 2, at 58, 60; PAUST,
supra note 2, at 143-44 n.43, 189-90 n.59; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 823 n.43; supra note 11. An
attempted declaration of non-self-execution of Articles 1-16 is also completely inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the CAT, since several of the articles are phrased in mandatory "shall" language that is typically self-
executing. Therefore, the declaration is void ab initio under international law, of no legal effect, and should be
withdrawn. Moreover, the rights and duties reflected in the Convention Against Torture are part of universally
binding customary international law and peremptoryjus cogens that pertain in any event. Supra notes 8, 11, 51.
53. See supra note 11.
54. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 33, arts. 12(3), 18(3), 19(3), 21, 22(2).
55. See, e.g., id. art. 4(1).
56. CAT, supra note 37, art. 2(2); supra notes 48-50.
57. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 820-23; Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note
2, at 357, 360-64.
58. See, e.g., Paust, Unlawful Authorizations, supra note 2, at 357, 360, 366-67; Paust, Executive Plans,
supra note 2, at 816-20.
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contains an absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment59 that is nonderogable. 60 The prohibition is also customary jus cogens
that prevails over any inconsistent treaty, attempted treaty reservations, or any
inconsistent ordinary (and non-peremptory) customary international law.6 '
Part of the Bush-Cheney "common plan" and "program" of tough and coercive
interrogation involved authorized and abetted use of tactics, already recognized as
torture, that are proscribed under all circumstances, such as: waterboarding or
related inducement of suffocation, the cold-cell or related inducement of
hypothermia, use of dogs to create intense fear or to terrorize, and threatening to
kill a detainee or family members. 62 For example, at least twenty-nine U.S. federal
and state court cases, and three cases from the European Court of Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, recognized that waterboarding or
related inducement of suffocation is torture.63 Remarkably, the same recognition
was contained in seven U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices of other countries prior to and during the Bush-Cheney program.
Additionally, fourteen U.S. federal and state court cases, one case in the European
Court of Human Rights, and two U.S. Department of State Country Reports on
Human Rights had recognized that the cold-cell or related inducement of
65hypothermia constitutes torture. The fact that misuse of dogs and death threats
can constitute torture also had prior recognition in U.S. cases and U.S. Department
of State Country Reports on Human Rights.6 6
All that an attorney in the Bush-Cheney Administration had to do was to turn
on his computer and engage in normal computer-assisted research in order to
identify numerous U.S. federal and state court cases, the European and American
Courts of Human Rights cases, and the U.S. Country Reports. Moreover, there was
additional evidence that a number of tactics were torture and that others were cruel
or inhumane, including warnings to high level members of the Bush
Administration from the International Committee of the Red Cross,67 and warnings
from a number of lawyers in the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and professional military services. These lawyers were simply ignored when they
claimed that use of coercive interrogation was unlawful. 8 As noted previously, it is
59. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 7; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 820-22; Paust, Absolute
Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1535-37, 1539-40, 1542; supra note 35.
60. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 4; supra note 35.
61. See supra notes 11, 35.
62. See, e.g., Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1553-57, 1559-61, passim; Zelikow Memo,
supra note 7, at 4 (describing threats to kill); id. at 6 ("waterboard[ing], walling, dousing, stress positions, and
cramped confinement").
63. See, e.g., Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1553-55 n.69.
64. See, e.g., Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1555-57 n.69.
65. Id. at 1555-57 n.72.
66. Id. at 1556 nn.70-71. A number of other unlawful tactics were identified. Id. at 1557-58 (including
stripping persons naked during interrogation and use of prolonged nudity, sexual humiliation, beating, kicking,
prolonged shackling, and confinement in a box to create intense fear).
67. See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 849-50; Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at
1558 n.73.
68. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 3, 6-8, 14-15, 42-43; Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 2, at 825-
26, 829-30, 843.
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difficult to believe that persons who attended meetings of the National Security
Council's Principals Committee in the White House during 2002 and 2003 would
not have realized that tactics often discussed, and in some cases viewed during
such meetings (such as waterboarding, the cold-cell, and use of dogs) were torture.
If the tactics did not qualify as torture or cruel treatment, they were, at a minimum,
manifestly inhumane. 69 In any event, criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment does not require knowledge that
conduct being facilitated constitutes one of these unlawful forms of treatment of a
human being.70
IV. DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNLAWFUL PROGRAM
As noted in another writing, several deleterious consequences can occur from
use of illegal interrogation tactics and secret detention that have been part of the
Bush-Cheney common plan and program. These consequences can include: placing
our people in harm's way with regard to criminal liability, civil liability, mental
harm and impacts on well-being; denial of POW status and combatant immunity;
mission failure with respect to production of faulty intelligence; inhibition of
cooperative prevention and responses; degradation of our military; degradation of
inter-agency cooperation; contribution to the causes of terrorism; aid to the enemy,
including rallying the enemy, unwitting support of enemy status and methods,
71inhibition of prosecution; and deflation of U.S. authority, law, and U.S. power.
Clearly, the Bush-Cheney program and Obama's refusal to prosecute are a threat to
the rule of law and our fundamental values.
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg aptly noted, in a different circumstance, with
respect to "harsh" and "brutal conditions of . . . confinement" of a person detained
for sixteen days as a material witness, "[h]is ordeal is a grim reminder of the need
to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will
control officialdom even in perilous times."72
CONCLUSION
Quite clearly, the Bush-Cheney program of widespread and systematic torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment was a serialized affront to human
69. See Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1559-61 & n.76.
70. See supra note 15.
71. Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5201, 5204-20 (2009).
72. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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dignity, which is itself a fundamental human right73 and a venerable constitutional
precept.74 As noted in another writing,
[t]he full truth about conspiratorial and complicit involvement and
the embrace of what Vice President Cheney has correctly
described as "the dark side" remains partly hidden. What is
evident, however, is that when one walks on the "dark side" with
evil one does not walk in the light with God. In this respect, the
following recognition made during our Civil War and placed in the
1863 Lieber Code on the laws of war is particularly poignant:
"[m]en who take up arms .. . in public war do not cease on this
account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to
God."75
"Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of
the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."
-Matthew 25:40
APPENDIX
TORTURE TIMELINE SEPTEMBER 2001-2007
Set. 16, 2001 Cheney admits that the Bush Administration needs to walk on "the
dark side."76
Sept. 17, 2001 It is reported that Bush authored a 12-page directive or
Memorandum of Notification to the National Security Council
allowing the secret detention (which is a crime against humanity)
and interrogation of prisoners.7 7
Nov. 6, 2001 Philbin sends a memo to Gonzales regarding trial of detainees for
war crimes but denial of Geneva protections.
Dec. 2001 Senior lawyers meet for several months.
73. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, pmbl. (stating the reaffirmation of "fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person"); CAT, supra note 37, pmbl. ("[The Convention recognizes] that ... ["equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family"] derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.");
ICCPR, supra note 33, pmbl. ("[The Covenant recogni[zes] . . . the inherent dignity and . . . the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 37,
pmbl. (same), art. I ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.").
74. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry
Into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 149-83 (1984) (documenting use of human dignity in numerous
court opinions up to the early 1980s).
75. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100,
art. 15 (1863) (the 1863 Lieber Code), reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 101, 101-02 (2006).
76. PAUST, supra note 2, at 12.
77. Id. at 28.
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Late 2001
2002
Jan. 9, 2002
Jan. 11, 2002
Jan. 2002
Jan. 14, 2002
Mid-Jan. 2002
Jan. 22, 2002
Jan. 24, 2002
Jan. 25, 2002
Jan. 26, 2002
Jan. 26, 2002
Feb. 1,2002
Feb. 2, 2002
Early 2002
Feb. 7, 2002
Feb. 26, 2002
Mar. 13, 2002
Mar. 28, 2002
Secret Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) memo warns
against use of SERE tactics.
Presidential finding signed by Bush, Rice, Ashcroft approving
waterboarding.78
John Yoo and Robert Delahunty coauthor a memo addressed to
Haynes that supports denial of Geneva protections.
First detainees arrive at GTMO.
Yoo and others flew to GTMO.79
Secret Yoo-Delahunty memo exists regarding the War Crimes
Act's application to interrogation.
Lawyers meet in the White House, consensus eludes group, and
Gonzales summarizes for Bush.
Bybee (and possibly Yoo) memo is sent to Gonzales and Haynes
denying Geneva law. In his February 7 memo, Bush says he
accepted "the legal conclusion" of Bybee's memo.
Secret Yoo memo exists regarding the obligations of the U.S.
under international law.
Gonzales memo sent to Bush to deny Geneva law protections.80
Powell memo sent to Gonzales and Assistant to President for
National Security Affairs regarding Geneva law."
Secret Bybee memo exists regarding options for interpreting the
Geneva Conventions.
Ashcroft sent a letter to Bush seeking denial of Geneva
protections.
Taft sent a memo to Gonzales.
Yoo, Gonzales, Addington, Flanigan, and Haynes meet to discuss
"pain" to inflict.
Bush authorized the denial of Geneva protections. 8 2
Bybee sent Haynes a memo regarding potential domestic legal
constraints and the use of information from coercive interrogation
of detainees from Afghanistan.
Bybee sent Haynes a memo regarding the transfer of detainees to
other countries.
Abu Zubaydah was captured. 83
78. Id. at 28, 179 n.19.
79. See supra note 1.
80. See Memorandum for the President by Alberto Gonzales, Re: Decision re: Application of the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Gonzales Memo to President of Jan. 25, 20021, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBl27/02.01.25.pdf.
81. See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, on Draft Decision Memorandum for the
President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan to the Counsel to the
President (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBBfNSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf.
82. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Re: Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/pub-artc4potusdetermination.pdf.
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Apr. 2002 CIA General Counsel has discussions with Bellinger, Legal
Advisor of NSC, regarding the CIA's proposed interrogation plan
for Abu Zubaydah.84 Bellinger briefs Rice and Gonzales.s
Apr. 2002 Gonzales approves the use of several tactics several times prior to
Bybee's August 2002 memo.
Apr. 2002 CIA videotapes detainee interrogations.
May 2002 CIA General Counsel attorneys meet with Ashcroft, Rice,
Bellinger, Gonzales and others to discuss particular tactics,
including waterboarding.8 ' Subsequently, the CIA's Office of
General Counsel asks OLC [DOJ] for an opinion.88
July 2002 Bybee meets with Yoo and Ashcroft to discuss SERE tactics.
July 2002 JPRA sent a memo to Haynes that warns against use of SERE
tactics and that waterboarding is equal to "torture".
July 13, 2002 Yoo sent a letter to CIA Acting General Counsel Rizzo regarding
specific intent as it relates to the crime of torture.
July 13, 2002 Attorneys from the CIA General Counsel Office meet with
Bellinger, possibly with Yoo (a Deputy Assistant AG from OLC),
Gonzales, and others to "provide an overview of the proposed
interrogation plan for Abu Zubaydah."90
July 17, 2002 Rice "conveyed" Bush's "policy authorization" to use
waterboarding if OLC will write an opinion granting approval.91
July 24, 2002 Facsimile was sent to Yoo regarding psychological assessment of
Abu Zubaydah.
July 24, 2002 Ashcroft okays certain harsh tactics. 92
July 26, 2002 Ashcroft okays waterboarding. 93
Aug. 1, 2002 Two Bybee memos exist-(1) Bybee to Gonzales, and (2) Bybee
to Rizzo (the second memo, Bybee to Rizzo, refers to oral approval
of tactics on July 24 & 26 and is a smoking gun regarding
complicity).
Aug. 2002 FBI Director Robert Mueller decides that the FBI will not
participate in coercive interrogation with military personnel.
83. Senate Select Intelligence Comm., Declassified Narrative: OLC Opinions on the CIA Detention and
Interrogation Program (Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Declassified Narrative], available at
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. NPR: All things Considered, supra note 1.
87. Declassified Narrative, supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, In 2002, Military Agency Warned Against 'Torture,' WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
2009 (noting that a 2002 military report to DOD General Counsel Haynes warned that extreme duress can yield
unreliable information).
90. Declassified Narrative, supra note 83; PAUST, supra note 2, at 28; see also id. at 158 n.89 (meetings of
Gonzales, Haynes, Addington regarding waterboarding and other unlawful tactics).
91. Declassified Narrative, supra note 83; Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Remarks at Stanford
University (Apr. 27, 2009).
92. Declassified Narrative, supra note 83.
93. Id
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Sept. 2002 Goldsmith starts to work with Haynes as Special Counsel in DOD
Office of General Counsel.
Sept. 26, 2002 Addington, Gonzales, Haynes, Goldsmith, Rizzo, Philbin, and
others flew to Guantdnamo Bay to discuss and observe SERE
tactics.
Oct. 11, 2002 Major General Dunlavey sends memo to General Hill, So. Comm.,
seeks enhanced interrogation tactics for Guantinamo, and Hill
forwarded it to Chairman, JCS.94
Nov. 27, 2002 Haynes prepares an action memo for Rumsfeld.
Dec. 2, 2002 First Rumsfeld memo created for enhanced interrogation at
Guantanamo Bay.
Dec. 4, 2002 Abu Zubaydah reportedly transferred from secret CIA site in
Thailand to secret CIA site near Szymany, Poland.9 5
Dec. 2002 CIA memo prohibits some tactics but not if "reasonably required"
or if specifically approved.9 6
Jan. 15, 2003 Rumsfeld rescinded general approval of illegal tactics and orders
Haynes to set up DOD Working Group.
Jan. 24, 2003 CIA's Muller and Rizzo meet with Chertoff, Fisher, Yoo, and
other DOJ personnel to discuss detainee abuses and possible
criminality. Chertoff warns that the use of a weapon to frighten a
detainee could violate the law.
Jan. 28, 2003 George Tenet sets Guidelines on Interrogation (including
waterboarding).
Jan. 28, 2003 George Tenet sets Guidelines on Confinement.
Feb. 6, 2003 Alberto Mora and John Yoo meet to discuss torture.9 7
Mar. 3, 2003 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is captured and reportedly subjected to
waterboarding 183 times in March.98 After discussions on January
24 and 28 with CIA's Rizzo and Muller, Yoo has a draft memo
sent to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, which is used for
subsequent CIA Legal Principles or Bullet Points memo in April
thru June 2003.9
Mar. 14, 2003 Yoo sent a memo to Haynes regarding illegal tactics.
Apr. 4, 2003 Mary Walker chairs a DOD Working Group, which issues a
Report (allegedly not signed by group). 00
Apr. 2003 JAGS & Mora protest unlawful tactics.o10
94. PAUST, supra note 2, at 12-13, 154, 158.
95. Abu Zubaydah Recognized as a Victim in Poland's CIA Secret Prison Investigation, HUMAN RIGHTS
HOUSE-POLAND (Jan. 28, 2011), http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/15842.html.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 181 n.27.
98. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History ofAmerica 's Extraordinary Rendition Program,
THE NEW YORKER, 145 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2006/10/30/061030ta talk mayer.
99. "Legal Principles" Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, CIA (June 16, 2003); see
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id. at l4-15.
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Apr. 16, 2003 Rumsfeld approves 24/25 recommended tactics, some illegal, and
says will approve other tactics at request. 102
Apr. 28, 2003 CIA Gen. Counsel Muller has draft of Legal Principles memo sent
to Yoo for review and reworking.10 3 Jennifer Koester (for Yoo)
does so and sends it back.'04 The Muller draft expressly mentions
"the water board," among other tactics. 05
May 14, 2003 Yoo sent a memo to Haynes regarding Military Interrogation of
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States in
which he argues that the Commander in Chief is above the law. 06
May 30, 2003 John Yoo leaves OLC, DOJ, and is replaced by Pat Philbin.
June 16, 2003 "Final" Bullet Points memo sent from Scott Muller to Philbin.' 07
The memo lists claims to be made why laws allegedly do not apply
or are not violated and lists several interrogation tactics, including
"the water board." 08 Philbin notes that such is not an OLC, DOJ
memo and might disagree on some points.' 09
June 2003 Amnesty International Report exists regarding abuse in Iraq.'" 0
Aug. 18, 2003 Major General Miller sent to Iraq to upgrade interrogation, with
template from GTMO."i1
Rumsfeld memo exists at Abu Ghraib, Iraq.112
Sept. 14, 2003 Lieutenant General Sanchez creates a memo that approved illegal
tactics.' 13
Oct. 12, 2003 The Sanchez memo is revised."14
Oct. 2003 Goldsmith moves from Haynes office in DOD to DOJ's OLC.
Nov. 2003 ICRC issues a report on Abu Ghraib and states that ICRC issued
warnings of abuse, including "a broad pattern ... and a system of"
abuse, to highest level officials and others since start of war in Iraq
in April 2003."
Dec. 2003 Goldsmith withdraws the Yoo March 14, 2003 memo but tells
DOD that tactics are okay.
Jan. 2004 ICRC warns Rice, Powell, and Wolfowitz about abuse at
Guantainamo Bay and in Iraq."16
Feb. 2004 ICRC report exists on abuse in Iraq."17
102. Id. at 15.
103. Muller memo to Yoo, supra note 10.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 10.
106. Memorandum from John Yoo for William Haynes (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo armytorture-memo.pdf.
107. CIA Muller memo, supra note 10.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. PAUST, supra note 2, at 162-63 n. 143.
Ill. Id.at16.
112. Id. at 26-27.
113. Id. at 16, 27, 174-75 n.7.
114. Id. at l6.
115. Id. at 17, 162 n.143.
116. PAUST, supra note 2, at 17, 162 n.144.
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Feb. 2004 Taguba report is created." 8
Mar. 19, 2004 Goldsmith creates a memo for illegal transfer of non-POWS from
Iraq."l 9
May 2004 Pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib are disclosed-Administration
says only "a few bad apples" were involved.
May 2004 Cambone provides admissions before Senator Levin's
Committee.12 0
May 7, 2004 CIA Inspector General John L. Helgerson's Report states some
tactics criminal; Cheney is irate, calls Helgerson to his office. 21
June 2004 Goldsmith finally withdraws the second Bybee memo (eight
months after learning of it).
July 2004 ICRC sends a report to Bush regarding the system of torture and
the cruel and degrading treatment at Guantanamo Bay. 122
July 7, 2004 Mora memo is sent to IG Navy.12 3
July 22, 2004 DOJ "offered the CIA interim assurance that it could use all
methods except waterboarding, which Mr. Goldsmith had
questioned. On Aug. 6, Mr. [Daniel] Levin issued another interim
letter reauthorizing waterboarding." 24
Aug. 2004 Final Report of Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention
Operations is issued
Sept. 24, 2004 Porter Goss becomes DCI.
Oct. 2004 Congress' resolution against torture and cruel treatment is
passed.125
Dec. 30, 2004 Levin OLC Memo replaces the Bybee memo on torture.
Jan. 26, 2005 Stephen Hadley becomes Director of NSC (Rice is Sec. State).
Mar. 8, 2005 Cheney briefs lawmakers on unlawful tactics and made forceful,
impassioned defense of the tactics-meetings occur in the White
House Situation Room, with CIA officers.126
April 22, 2005 Deputy AG James Comey (ODAG) sends an email to Chief of
Staff Chuck Rosenberg stating that at a meeting on April 22 with
AG Gonzales, Pat Philbin, and Steve Bradbury, he "expressed ...
concerns, saying the analysis was flawed and that I had grave
reservations about the second opinion" [the draft Bradbury memo
117. Id. at 162 n.143.
118. Id. at 160-61 nn.134 & 138; United States Central Command, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th
Military Police Brigade, 2004, 15-20, available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abusereport.pdf.
119. Id.atl8,163n.148.
120. Id. at 160 n.135.
121. Jordan J. Paust, The Complicity of Dick Cheney: No 'Necessity'Defense, (May 18, 2009), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/05/complicity-of-dick-cheney-no-necessity.php.
122. PAUST, supra note 2, at 17, 163 n.145.
123. Id. at 174 n.5, 176 n.12.
124. Scott Shane & David Johnson, Lawyers Agreed on the Legality of Brutal Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2009, at Al.
125. PAUST, supra note 2, at 177 n.13.
126. Paul Kane & Joby Warrick, Cheney Led Briefings of Lawmakers to Defend Interrogation Techniques,
WASH. POST, June 3, 2009, at Al.
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127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
Shane & Johnson, supra note 124 (describing Comey email to Rosenberg of April 22, 2005).
Id. (adding "I explained to him . .. that some of this stuff is simply awful").
PAUST, supra note 2, at 28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 173 n.1.
Zelikow Memo, supra note 7.
Id. at 187-88 n.44.
Id. at 173 n.1.
Exec. Order No. 13408, 71 Fed. Reg. 37807 (July 3, 2006).
Shane & Johnson, supra note 124.
PAUST, supra note 2, at 42.
Id. at 43, 198 nn.135-38.
84 Vol. 18, No. 1
regarding "combined effects"]: "The AG explained that he was
under great pressure from the Vice President to complete both
memos. ... He added that the VP kept telling him 'we are getting
killed on the Hill."'"
27
May 10, 2005 Two Bradbury memos sent to CIA Rizzo regarding the illegal
tactics and torture statute.
May 30, 2005 Bradbury memo sent to CIA Rizzo regarding CAT art. 16.
May 31, 2005 AG Gonzales attends National Security Council's Principals
Committee meeting [of AG Gonzales, Sec. Rice, DCI Goss, Sec.
Rumsfeld, Nat. Sec. Adv. Stephen Hadley, etc.] and reports to
Deputy AG Comey and others that all Principals approved the full
list of tactics in the Bradbury memos.' 2 8
Oct. 2005 Cheney conducts more lawmaker briefings and defends tactics.
Oct. 2005 The Senate approves the McCain Amendment.129
Nov. 2005 Addington and Cheney continue to advocate for illegal tactics. 13 0
Nov. 2005 Cheney conducts another lawmaker briefing and defends tactics.
Nov. 2005 DCI Goss admits CIA tactics would be restricted under the
McCain Amendment.' 3 1
Dec. 14, 2005 The House approves McCain Amendment.
Dec. 30, 2005 Detainee Treatment Act becomes a federal statute.
Feb. 15, 2006 The U.N. Experts' report is issued.13 2
Feb. 16, 2006 The Zelikow Memo is issued on the McCain Amendment and
CAT obligations.133
Mar. 30, 2006 ASEL resolution exists on torture.13 4
May 8, 2006 Michael Hayden becomes DCI.
May 18, 2006 CAT Committee issues a Report regarding the United States.1 35
June 29, 2006 The United States Supreme Court decides Hamdan case (and that
GC 3 applies as a minimum set of rights and duties).
July 2006 Bush issues an Executive Order re-authorizing unlawful tactics.136
Bradbury had reviewed and approved a draft.137
July 7, 2006 Gordon England memo requires the military to follow Geneva
common article 3.138
Sept. 5, 2006 New DOD Directive issued on interrogation.13
Sept. 6, 2006 New Army Field Manual 2-22.3 issued.14 0
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Sept. 6, 2006 Bush admits having a "program" of "secret" detention (a crime
against humanity) and "tough" treatment.14 1
Dec. 18, 2006 Robert Gates replaces Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.
Feb. 2007 An ICRC report was issued regarding "High Value Detainees" and
illegal tactics. 14 2
140. Id. at 43, 199 nn.139-40.
141. Id. at 29.
142. Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 1, at 1558 n.73.
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